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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the effects of M&A to investment returns in South Africa. The value of 
M&A executed in emerging economies (EM) is around $129 billion (The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2014) and this figure is projected to double 
in the next ten years bringing positive economic development in EM. In light of this perspective, 
there is renewed interest in understanding the economics of M&A in developing countries. Our 
aim was to assess the extent of mergers and acquisition on shareholder returns in South Africa 
using a case study approach. A case study approach was adopted in order to analyse the impact 
of specific events on shareholder value by date. Two prominent mergers involving acquiring 
companies from Developed Markets (DM) were selected namely AB Inbev (Belgium) and 
Walmart (US). As anticipated, the results show that each merger update announcement had an 
impact on the share price of the target based on the type of announcement. Positive news 
increased the share price and bad news adversely impacted the share price. Post the merger, 
Massmart’s headcount increased and profitability decreased. The same could not be measured 
for SABMiller as the company has been delisted. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the introduction to the thesis. Section 1.2 presents the context of the study; 
Section 1.3 the problem statement; Section 1.4 the objectives of the study; Section 1.5 explains 
the gaps in the literature; Section 1.6 outlines the benefits of the study and Section 1.7  concludes 
with  the organization of the thesis. 
1.2 Context of the Study 
Developing countries have overtime increased their production output as evidenced by growth in 
total gross domestic product (GDP) amounting to US$21.2 trillion. Thus, the developing 
countries’ GDP currently represents about 26.4% of global GDP compared to their 12% 
contribution two centuries ago (Gusarova, 2013).  The South African economy faced challenges 
in 2016 and is facing the possibility of a rating downgrade, with investors and rating agencies 
still watching closely. One of these challenges continues to be the high unemployment rate 
among youth with an increase of 54.2% in unemployed youth between the ages of 15-24 in Q3 
(The World Bank, 2017). According to this report, only 5,000 additional jobs were created (net) 
since Q3 2015.  It is at this critical time that the government needs to ensure that the country is 
an attractive investment destination in order to attract foreign investors. 
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the investment into a country by a company from another 
country. Various investment channels are used to attract investment opportunities. A Greenfield 
investment is when a company starts up a new subsidiary in another country from the start 
without leveraging on any existing company or brand. A Brownfield investment occurs when a 
company invests in an existing company that already has production facilities in that country. 
FDI increases the net cash inflows into an economy resulting in an increase in GDP. A study by 
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Sumner (2005) that sought to find the role of FDI in developing economies in reducing poverty 
and increasing economic growth has found various outcomes per region. Asia benefits more 
from FDI than Africa and Latin America. FDI has been found to be good for general growth but 
not per capita as it benefits skilled workers more than the unskilled (poor) and therefore 
increases income inequalities.  
Dailami, Kurlat and Lim (2012) argue that most companies from developed countries enter the 
African markets looking for opportunities to overcome trade barriers (e.g., tariffs and quotas). 
These companies also want to take advantage of trade openness (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012) as 
well as positioning themselves in these untapped markets (Sethi, 2009). Understanding the pre-
post-merger impact is essential, especially when Rahahleh and Wei (2012) show that there is a 
decline in returns for firms undertaking frequent acquisitions in other emerging markets. King, 
Slotegraaf and Kesner (2008) report that firm’s post-merger performance is reliant on certain 
complementary resources. Other factors surrounding emerging economies’ mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) deals have been found to influence performance. These factors include 
payment type (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004), deal type (Loughran & Vijh, 1997) 
ownership structure (Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Ness, 2002), management characteristics (Krishnan, 
Miller, & Judge, 1997), previous performance (Heron & Lie, 2002), firm size (Moeller, 
Schlingemannb, & Stulzc, 2004), prior acquisition experience (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999)  
and environmental factors such as merger waves (McNamara, Haleblian , & Dykes , 2008).  
In South Africa, mergers are monitored by the South African Competition Commission 
(Commission) and the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal). Mergers are to be reported to the 
Commission and the Tribunal’s role is to adjudicate appeals from the Commission. The 
Commission reported 330 mergers that are either pending (50) or completed (280) in 2016. Of 
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the M&A’s that are completed, only 26% of them are classified as large and 14% of those have 
been approved with conditions. Globally, South Africa ranks number 49 out of 140 countries on 
the Competitiveness Index 2015-2016, performing better than advanced economies such as 
Slovak Republic (67
th
) and Greece (81
st
). This makes it the second highly ranked sub-Saharan 
African country second to Mauritius. The number of companies that have invested in SA has 
increased from only seven in 1990 to about 1610 in 2014 (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2016)). Similarly, mergers of South African companies out of SA 
have also increased since 1990. There is a large increase in M&A transactions post-1994 and a 
drop between 1998 and 2002. A positive net inflow into SA exists when considering the number 
of companies that have invested in the country (not by size). The world’s cross-border mergers 
also follow a similar trend as the growth rate in cross-border M&A’s has declined both in SA 
and internationally since 2008 (UNCTAD, 2016). A report by Delloite (2014) shows that M&A 
activity in Africa has been focused on South Africa and Nigeria, the top economies in Africa. 
Manufacturing and Financial Services are the top sectors while Health Care is the lowest. 
South African companies remain favourites for acquiring companies. A report by Bureau van 
Dijk, (2016) ranked them 24
th
 in Q1 2016. Among high profile mergers in 2015-2016, there was 
the acquisition of Mediclinic International by Al Noor Hospitals Group Plc. On the contrary, the 
acquisition of Pfizer by Allergan Plc was abandoned due to political reasons while the 
Commission prohibited the Italtile Limited and Ceramics Industries Proprietary Limited merger 
valued at $282million.  Associated British Foods Plc, a British food processing company, 
increased their stake in Illovo Sugar Ltd from 51% to 100% in 2016. The year 2016 also saw the 
launch of the world-renowned Krispy Kreme entering Africa through KK Doughnuts SA. 
However, the acquisition of Massmart by Walmart in 2010 and the acquisition of SABMiller by 
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AB Inbev in 2016 remain the two most popular acquisitions to date in South Africa. Globally, 
the SABMiller takeover has been the biggest merger in the beer industry of all time (Forbes, 
2016) combining the top two brands within the industry. The acquisition of Massmart by 
Walmart was the first of its kind in the retail space in South Africa. Both mergers are recent, the 
companies involved are listed and information relating to these mergers has been readily 
available in the media. 
The aim of this study was to determine factors making the domestic firms attractive to these 
foreign firms. More importantly, the study sought to investigate the extent to which these cross-
border mergers impact on shareholder wealth as measured by share price, operating profit and on 
macro-economic factors such as unemployment. The study used a case study methodology. 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
According to the World Bank (2011), the massive growth in developing economies has been 
attributed to the increase in the attraction of global FDI resulting in more M&Q deals. With 
South Africa’s GDP not showing much growth with the second and third quarter in 2016 
growing at 3.3% and 0.2% after a decline of 1.2% in Q1, the attraction of FDI becomes critical.  
The extant literature on M&As has found mixed results in terms of whether mergers add value to 
the shareholders (Tao, Liua, Gaoa, & Xiab, 2016).  Some authors demonstrate specifically that 
cross-border M&As do not result in abnormal returns for the shareholders (Aybar & Ficici, 
2009). Considering the biasness of the literature towards developed economies, the rise in M&A 
deals in South Africa prompts a need to investigate deals broadly. Currently, limited research has 
been done in South Africa despite operating one of the world’s most reputable stock markets. 
The only literature that was found to contribute to this topic in the context of the South African 
market is a report by Barzeva and Grimbeek (2016). This report also uses the case study model 
as similar to what has been used in this report and profiles five mergers. However, the companies 
selected in this study belong to the food and agro-processing sector only and not all acquirers are 
foreign investors. Other scholars have conducted overall research on this topic such as Aybar and 
Ficici (2009) who focus on mergers in emerging markets in general.  
Because of its infrastructural development, South Africa is viewed by most as the gateway to 
enter most African markets. This may be the reason why in the recent past, Walmart bought a big 
stake in Massmart and AB InBev has acquired 100% of SABMiller. As much as these 
transactions benefit South Africa through FDI, the actual mergers are supposed and expected to 
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benefit the relevant (acquirers and target) companies’ shareholders. The problem is, it is still not 
very clear whether there is a destruction or an enhancement of value in cross-border mergers and 
also what has been the impact on employment after these mergers. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
In this study, we seek:    
 To establish what motivates a foreign company to acquire a domestic SA company. 
 To determine whether the target company’s shareholders benefit from the cross-border 
M&A transactions. 
 To establish the short-and medium-term market reaction to M&A announcements in 
South Africa. 
 To investigate the post-merger impact on firm operating performance and employment.  
1.5 Gap in the Literature 
 
Cross-border mergers remain relevant in South Africa and will continue to occur because Africa 
has been identified as the fastest growing continent with an immense amount of unexplored 
growth potential. The significance of this analysis stems from unknown effects of M&A deals in 
Africa and in BRIC countries (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). Such enquiry is significant in 
helping emerging economies to uncover macro financial vulnerabilities that are associated with 
M&As. The current results are naturally expected to have not been documented before, 
especially the proposed firm size effect analysis. This makes it difficult to hypothesize the 
possible outcome of the study. For example, even Seth, Song and Pettit (2002) highlight that 
literature remains inconclusive in addressing this question of whether M&A deals give positive 
returns. Some studies have reported that M&As decrease shareholder value of the acquiring 
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company while other studies reject the notion (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Hansen & 
Lott, 1996). The reason for some of these discrepancies in the literature is driven by different 
methodology in executing the research question.  Data availability also presents a major 
challenge that constrains the methodological options (Lin, Peng, Yang & Sun, 2009). 
 In our underlying analytic framework, we have followed recent studies and used abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns model as supported by Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010); Peng and 
Beamish, (2014) and Song (2014). This procedure allows us to study the short-and long-term 
shifts in market share before, during and after the deal. The case study method of research has 
been adopted in this report. As noted by Reddy (2015), only 93 journals to date on M&As  make 
use of this method of research. Furthermore, only 29% of these studies are conducted on M&As 
that occur in emerging economies. The advantage of using this method of research is that case 
studies examines data within its context and that real-life complexities are captured which is not 
the case in experimental research (Zainal, 2007). Few studies use case study as a matter analysis 
of how events unfold in the process of M&As. Additionally, most studies (Calandro, 2008; 
Erickson & Wang, 2007) concentrate on share performance from mergers announcements and do 
not look at macroeconomic factors such as unemployment. Therefore, by executing this analysis, 
we aim to fill this gap and assisting the investment community in emerging economies to 
uncover the true meaning of M&A in an African context.  
1.6 Benefits of the study 
With our analysis, we present the dynamic perspective about M&A transactions, especially post-
2008 financial crisis where the global economy has been performing relatively poor with more 
firms holding back on investments. Indeed, the assessment of this magnitude is of benefit to 
various stakeholders, namely, policy makers, shareholders, companies, and the stock market. 
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Policy makers such as the Competition Commission will be able to use the results of this study to 
make decisions regarding M&As that involve developed economy companies and South African 
companies. Shareholders can use the results of the study to make an informed decision when 
voting in favour of a merger. The management of potential target and acquiring companies can 
use these two case studies as a learning for their future endeavours. Lastly, the stock market can 
better prepare itself when M&A announcements are made. 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review. Chapter 3 
discusses the methodology used to test the market performance after the announcement of 
M&As. Chapter 4 discusses the results and Chapter 5 discusses and concludes the thesis. 
Chapter Summary 
South Africa has been a popular destination for companies to invest over the past years. 
However, very little research has been conducted to determine whether these mergers result in 
the creation of value to shareholders. The objectives of the study are to firstly determine if cross-
border merger result in increased shareholder value; secondly, if there are any market reactions 
to determine if they are of a short-or a long-term nature, and thirdly, to evaluate the impact on 
accounting data before and after the announcement.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on M&As. Section 2.2 gives the background of the two 
case studies under review. Section 2.3 presents the definition of M&As and other relevant 
terminologies. Section 2.4 covers the methods of acquisition and also expands on cross-border 
mergers in and out of emerging economies. Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 discusses cross border 
mergers and motives for cross-border M&As. Section 2.7 comprises of literature on the method 
of payment, Section 2.8 discusses hostile takeovers and defence tactics. Section 2.9 discusses the 
efficient market hypothesis and Section 2.10 discusses the post-acquisition returns. In 
conclusion, Section 2.11 closes with post-merger prescriptions, compliance thereof and impact to 
social welfare. 
2.2 Background of AB Inbev and Walmart 
Sam Walton founded Walmart in 1962. The retailer had been running its operations as a family-
owned business until 1970 when it first went public. To date, Walmart has grown its business by 
a combination of opening new outlets and by acquiring existing retailers locally and 
internationally. In 2016, Walmart’s revenue stream flows from three operating segments 
comprising Walmart US, which is the largest segment generating about 62% of total net sales. 
Walmart International encompasses 27 countries outside of the US and contributes 26% to total 
net sales and Sam’s Club that contributes 12% (Walmart) 
Walmart first entered the international market by opening a store in Mexico City in 1991.This 
then lead to a series of multinational store openings and acquisitions. Some of these investments 
have been successful and others not as successful. In 2006, Walmart sold its investment in South 
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Korea due to failing to meet the market requirements of customers in the country.  In the same 
year, 85 of its stores in Germany were also sold due to failing to make profits. These failed 
investments are both due to lack of consumer “buy-in” to the American culture of retailing. 
AB Inbev is built from a successful three-way merger between Interbrew (Belgium), Ambev 
(Brazil) and Anheuser-Busch (USA). The decision to invest in South Africa is not the company’s 
first endeavour in operating in a developing economy as Ambev is based in Brazil. The most 
recent merger transaction was led by the sitting CEO, Carlos Brito.  He was appointed as the 
CEO of Ambev in January 2004. He did not only participate in the Ambev-Interbrew merger but 
he was also part of the Inbev and Anheuser-Busch merger. Apart from his smooth negotiation 
skills and rich business acumen, this leader is known for his inordinate cost cutting measures. At 
the age of 55, Carlos has already led three successful international mergers during his tenure at 
AB Inbev. When Inbev was formed in 2008, about 1400 (6% of staff) employees in the US were 
laid off in addition to 1000 voluntary retrenchments in the same financial year (CNN Money, 
2008). The company also laid-off an undisclosed number of workers across various functions in 
2014. 
AB Inbev has more than 200 brands with seven of those being ranked in the Global Top Ten 
most valuable beer brands. Lopes (2002) observes that brands play an important role in the 
strategies of companies that are in the Alcoholic Beverages industry. AB Inbev has a footprint in 
North America, Latin America North, Mexico, Latin America South, Asia Pacific, and Europe 
with North America being its highest EBITDA contributor and Latin America North is the 
highest volume contributor. The SABMiller merger will increase AB Inbev’s market share not 
only in Africa but also in its existing territories. Some analysts have speculated that this gain in 
market share appears to be a greater driver for the current merger than cost savings. 
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This was not the only merger transaction that SABMiller has participated in over this period. In 
November 2014, SABMiller, the Gutsche Family and the Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) 
announced the intention to merge bottling operations in Africa to create Coca-Cola Beverages 
Africa (CCBA), the largest Coca-Cola bottling operation in Africa. SABMiller would have a 
controlling interest of 55.4% in this entity the Gutsche Family would have 31.7% and TCCC 
would own 11.3% of this entity. However, the merger transaction incorporated a change of 
ownership clause for all parties giving the other owners a right to buyout any existing 
shareholder that undertakes a change of ownership. The merger deal between these entities was 
approved in May 2016 and the first phase of forming CCBA was completed. The second phase 
entails incorporating Swaziland, Botswana and Zambia. The Competition Commission raised a 
concern as AB Inbev distributes Pepsi in other parts of the world and post the merger will also be 
a major shareholder in Africa’s largest Coca-Cola bottler, Pepsi’s biggest rival globally. A 
confidentiality agreement was signed between the affected parties restricting the exchange of 
information.  Subsequent to the change of ownership of SABMiller to AB Inbev, TCCC 
announced in December 2016 the intention to buyout AB Inbev’s stake in CCBA and refranchise 
to another Coca-Cola Bottler.  
2.3 Definitions and type of mergers and acquisitions  
According to South African Competition Amendment Act (1999), a merger happens when one or 
more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or 
part of the business of another firm. In order to determine control, the portion of capital owned 
and voting rights are considered. If an entity owns more than half of the share capital, is entitled 
to major votes and has the capacity to appoint the majority of directors, then control is assumed. 
The Act further differentiates mergers into whether they are “small”, “intermediate” or “large” 
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based on threshold values. This differentiation is important as regulation requirements differ for 
each type.  The acquisition of assets is also considered as a merger. However, for the purpose of 
this research, all mergers refers to the acquisition of stock and not singular assets. 
Finance literature differentiates mergers into horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers 
(Correia, Flynn, Uliana, & Wormald, 2007). A horizontal merger occurs when firms that are in 
the same industry merge. These companies could even be competitors. An example of horizontal 
mergers in SA is the SABMiller and AB Inbev merger (complete) and the Massmart and 
Walmart merger (complete). A vertical merger occurs between two firms that are in the same 
industry but on different levels on the value chain. Vertical mergers pose no upfront competitive 
threat compared to horizontal mergers. However, the Act (South African Competition 
Amendment Act, 1999) has placed restrictions on any merger that will lessen competition in the 
market. A conglomerate is when two firms that are totally unrelated combine. The main reason 
for this type of merger is diversification. Mergers could also be classified as domestic or cross-
border. In a domestic merger, local firms that operate in the same geographical space merge. 
Cross-border mergers refer to the acquisition of a firm that has a domicile that is different from 
it. A report by (UNCTAD, 2016) shows the increase in mergers globally from 1990 – 2002. 
Post- 2002, the merger wave remained flat and started to decline post 2008. These global trends 
are also a representation of cross-border mergers trends in and out of developing countries. 
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2.4 Methods of acquisition 
Mergers are a mode of entry by multinationals into emerging economies (Yamakawa, Khavul, 
Peng, & Deeds, 2013).  A firm can be acquired by either acquisition of its assets only or 
acquisition of shares. The acquisition of assets is more favourable if the acquirer is targeting 
specific assets and does not also want to inherit the firm’s liabilities. Acquiring the shares of a 
firm would be favoured by an acquirer who wishes to buy the entire operating unit and continues 
with its operations in the same manner as prior to the acquisition. The latter seems to be more 
prevalent possibly since it is less expensive to transfer ownership of shares than the ownership of 
individual assets (Hiller, Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, & Jordan, 2013). 
In South Africa, there are tax benefits that accrue to an acquirer that has bought the assets of a 
company and not the shares. Thus, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) grants a S12C 
Capital Allowance to companies for manufacturing assets acquired at a rate of 20% each year 
(Handbook, 2016). If the target has an unused tax credit (assessed loss), then it will be to the of 
the acquirer’s advantage to buy the shares and not the assets in order to utilize the assessed loss. 
Also, interest on a loan to acquire assets is tax deductible while interest on a loan to buy shares is 
not. 
2.5 Cross-border mergers in and out of emerging economies 
Cross-border mergers have grown over the last decade even though scholars have proven 
through the empirical studies that they are generally not very successful. Cultural differences in 
cross-border mergers play an important role and serve as a double-edged sword. On one hand, 
there could be a positive impact in the learning opportunities that arise from the integration and 
on the other hand, poor integration could result in adverse consequences for the merged entity 
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(Reus & Lamont, 2009). Aybar and Ficici (2009) examined whether cross-border emerging 
market mergers create value and found a 1.38% decline in announcement day returns. 
Additionally, they found that cross-border M&As into emerging markets destroys value for more 
than 50% of the analyzed transactions. On the other hand, an opposing view presented by Chari, 
Ouimet and Tesar,(2010) show that when a firm in a developed economy acquires a company in 
an emerging economy then the acquirer’s returns show an abnormal return of 1.16% and no 
abnormal returns if the same firms acquire companies from developed markets. Also, the higher 
the asymmetry between these markets the higher the returns.  
H10 –Cross-border acquisition deals where companies from developed countries acquire SA 
companies do not significantly reduce the post-acquisition returns of the target and the 
acquirers’ shareholders. 
Research on mergers and acquisitions has been conducted extensively. However, the literature on 
cross-border M&As in emerging market is scant. Lebedev et al.,(2015) noted the importance of 
isolating M&As in emerging market mergers from those occurring in developed markets as the 
institutional environments, corporate governance and the markets are not similar.  It is also 
important to study emerging markets separately because the performance of the target firm is 
impacted by different factors. The extant literature found conflicting results on the performance 
of M&As in emerging markets. The origin of the acquirer also has an impact on the target’s 
performance. Bednarczyk, Schiereck and Walter (2010) found that acquirers from Central and 
Eastern Europe will positively impact the target’s short-term returns of related bids and 
negatively impact short-term returns of diversification bids. Chen (2011) conducted similar 
research based on US publicly traded firms. The results presented showed that acquisitions from 
developed markets lead to a higher labour productivity compared to domestic economies.  
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Luzina and Rogova (2015) reviewing mergers in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) countries found that only 71 (19.4%) mergers out of a total of 366 sampled mergers do 
not create value. The country with the highest deals in that sample is China (35%) and the 
country with the least number is South Africa (5.2%). A report by UNCTAD on cross-border 
transactions from 1990-2015 also shows a similar hierarchy by country, with China (30.6%) 
being the most popular and South Africa (8.9%) being the least popular among the BRICS 
countries. 
 
2.6 Motives for cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
Unlike domestic mergers, cross-border mergers introduce various elements that can create a 
challenging environment for the two companies to merge and operate. Obstacles such as 
regulatory approval, language and cultural differences and the effects of foreign exchange need 
to be overcome in order to make the merger a success. The 25-year compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of international acquisitions of firms in South Africa is 19.71% from 1990 
(UNCTAD, 2016). Among the reasons for this growth rate are synergies in the form of an 
increase in market share, cost reduction and tax advantages. Risk diversification and 
management self-interest are also drivers of these transactions. 
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2.6.1 Market Share 
The valuation of the target’s brands during a merger will be affected by various factors such as 
the acquiring firm's marketing capability and brand portfolio diversity  (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, & 
Srivastava, 2008; Lopes, 2002). Brands play an important role in the strategies of companies in 
the alcoholic beverages industry and that while most industries rely on science and technologies, 
the alcoholic beverage industry uses its brands as part of its growth strategies in foreign markets. 
The existence of a strong reputable brand within the target will make it easier for the acquirer to 
launch new goods/services in that market and therefore increase market power. Kim and Singal 
(1993) found that acquisitions are driven by firms seeking to increase market power. A merger 
also makes it legal to align prices in order to be more competitive and capture more of the market 
share. Without a merger contract, companies that are found aligning prices will be found guilty 
of collusion (Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012). Regulations can also put restrictions on the firm’s 
growth aspects. When a firm has reached a certain point, it could be restricted from dominating 
the market any further (Brakman, Garretsen, Van Marrewijk, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2013). In 
certain instances, companies have already reached saturation in their current home country and 
yet still have an appetite to grow further. This would then entice the firm to acquire a firm in 
another country where the market is not as saturated. Some researchers (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, 
& Boateng, 2012) noted that firms will invest in a foreign market when the domestic market 
becomes too competitive. The increase in market share translates into revenue enhancement for 
the merged entity. This is a direct economic benefit to the shareholders of the company. 
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2.6.2 Cost Reduction 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) argue that firms engage in M&A transactions to improve 
efficiency of their operations. In contrast, King, Slotegraaf and Kesner (2008) highlight 
operating costs as drivers for M&A. Synergies in terms of cost savings can be driven by, among 
others, economies of scale, standardization and reduction in product offerings, efficiency in 
warehouse costs and formation of centralized shared services (Correia, Flynn, Uliana, & 
Wormald, 2007). Economies of scale are driven by the increase in buying power of a larger 
entity versus when each entity had to buy separately. Suppliers also cannot partake in 
discrimination pricing as contract prices will be negotiated centrally. While this might be 
discriminatory to suppliers, an opportunity to supply products/services globally to the merged 
entity exclusively can assist in making the deal worthwhile for the supplier. 
The standardization of product offerings comprises internal alignment to ensure that the merged 
entity runs as efficiently as possible. The duplication of similar product offerings should be kept 
at a minimal for a horizontal merger. An opportunity to save on warehouse costs can present 
itself as a synergy during mergers. The efficient planning and alignment of inventory systems 
and good management of lead times could decrease the warehouse costs. This cost reduction 
should be measured at the net of any forgone revenue of leasing the extra warehouse facilities. 
Departments that are considered as “supporting functions” can be streamlined into a central 
point. This will reduce the staffing costs for the merged entity. However, this has adverse 
consequences on the community and the economy at large. Regulatory bodies are pressured by 
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employee unions to enforce “no retrenchment” conditions on mergers in order to protect 
workers. 
Do cross-border acquisition deals, where companies from developed countries acquire SA 
companies, result in increase in unemployment (Walmart)? 
A subject of interest though, when addressing the reduction of costs, is the impact that this is 
expected to have on the final consumer. With a reduction of costs, firms are expected to compete 
on price levels with their competitors and should be able to offer lower price points (due to lower 
unit costs) to consumers. In order to analyze the effect of this, the merger needs to be classified 
into either horizontal or vertical as economies of scale would be the driver for the former and 
transfer price alignment the driver for the latter.  
2.6.3 Tax Advantages 
Due to different tax laws, some entities operate in jurisdictions that have more lenient tax laws 
than others. This could be a motive to acquire a company in that country. The incentive of other 
tax benefits can also be realized in the form of utilizing carry forward assessed losses and tax 
credits, capital allowances and tax deductions for the interest on the acquisition of assets (not 
shares). After an attempt to capture the drivers of synergies, Devos, Kadapakkam, and 
Krishnamurthy (2009) found that 1.64% of the 10.03% of synergies can be attributable to tax 
benefits. Davos et al., (2009) did not focus on cross-border mergers only though but rather on 
large mergers of publicly traded companies. An example of such a transaction is when Coca-
Cola Enterprises (US) acquired Herb Coca-Cola (US) in 2001 for $1.07 billion. Incorporated in 
the expected synergies was an amount of $100 million attributable to tax benefits.  
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However, others have found that the decision to engage in a cross-border merger is not that 
sensitive to the tax environment. For example, Hebous, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2011) compared 
the sensitivity of tax between cross-border mergers and FDI Greenfield investments and found 
that Greenfield investments are more sensitive to the tax position more than mergers.  
2.6.4 Risk Diversification 
Diversification in mergers happens when a firm acquires another firm that is in a different 
operating geography or in a different industry.  When a company diversifies by investing in a 
different country, the foreign exchange effects should be to the benefit of the merged entity. 
Expected adverse foreign exchange rates are some of the reasons why some firms do not invest 
internationally. Georgopoulos (2008) found that the probability of a cross-border merger 
increases with a depreciation of real currency in the host country. This was found true mainly in 
industries that are high in R&D. This is due to the fact that such industries require long-term 
investments and that the returns on investments are only realized after many years.   
2.6.5 Knowledge Assets in the target 
An acquirer could have a certain perception about a potential target’s internal records and could 
be driven to acquire the target-based on those perceptions. However, a great dilemma arises 
when there is a need to value that information asset within the target (Mukherji, Mukherji, 
Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). Furthermore, once this knowledge has been acquired, then the transfer 
from the target to the acquirer might not be as smooth as expected (Coff, 1999). 
2.6.6 Available Free Cash flows and Management Self Interest: The agency 
problem 
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Free Cash Flows (FCF) are those cash flows that remain after the company has accounted for its 
operating and its capital expenditure. These cash flows would be used either to invest in growth 
projects or to be distributed to shareholders. A self-interest threat will arise if a company has too 
much cash on hand, as managers are then faced with making decisions between various uses for 
the cash. The agency theory states that managers are the agents of shareholders and this 
inherently puts them in a self-interest conflict position.  
Studies have found that drivers of mergers could be linked to managers’ self-interests (Agrawal 
& Walkling, 1994; Sanders, 2001). When a firm has excess FCF, the pay-out policies are more 
contested between management and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Among other factors, the 
management of a firm is evaluated by the growth of a firm from one period to the next. Murphy 
(1985) has found a positive relationship between sales and compensation.  Upon successfully 
achieving certain growth targets, managers would be remunerated accordingly. This creates an 
incentive for management to acquire firms that appear to be profitable in order to increase their 
financial performance. As per the clientele effect principle, though management is required to 
match their clientele’s dividend needs even though this might conflict with their own interests.  
Levi, Li, and Zhang (2010) profiled CEO’s based on their age, which is correlated to their 
testosterone levels in order to determine who will most likely initiate a bid. Young males initiate 
bids 4% higher than older CEO’s and have a 2% more chance of resorting to a tender offer. This 
is explained by the dominance-seeking behaviour in these leaders. Other researchers have also 
reached similar conclusions in that CEO egos are the driving force of mergers in the US 
(Boucher, 1980). 
Is the age and experience of the management team with previous mergers experience able to 
create post-acquisition value for the shareholders? 
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It is not only the acquirer’s cash flow’s position that drives mergers but also the target’s cash 
flow. A target’s high cash flow can attract firms that are looking to increase their liquidity 
position. Management in the target will pay-out more dividends when threats of takeover are 
high. Their self-interest is suppressed by the takeover threat (Oprea, 2008).  
2.6.7 Past company experience and Managerial Skill 
Management’s past success could be a driving factor in management’s overconfidence 
(Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Heaton, 2002). Mergers that are driven by managements’ 
egos are found to be value-destroying as management overestimates their capabilities (Roll, 
1986). In deciding whether to continue with the deal, (Luo (2005) found that management does 
consider how the public reacts to the announcement if the companies announce the deal without 
a signed contract, if the acquirer is a small to medium cap company or if investors have a lot of 
information about the deal. If the public reacts positively to the news of the announcement, then 
the deal will most likely be sealed. However, if investors do not, then consummation will not 
occur. The management of the acquirer and the target rely on the efficiency of the market based 
on the information that investors have on the deal. A company’s experience in a cross-border 
merger will positively impact the likelihood of a subsequent cross-border merger. Additionally, a 
second merger being in the same country as the first is even more likely (Collins, Holcomb, 
Certo, Hitt, & Lester, 2009).  
Considering the diversity of these views, it is clear that more work remains to be done in 
emerging markets. The effects of cross-border acquisitions in the target’s operating environment 
need to be further evaluated. Mergers usually come with a set of prescriptions from the 
competition regulators in order to protect the community in which the target operates. These 
come in the form of employment security for existing staff, community improvement social 
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funds or long-term procurement contracts with local suppliers. While the competition 
commission does track these projects, more work needs to be done to measure the social impact 
that these projects have on various stakeholders. Also, it is worth knowing what acquiring 
companies do after the “commitment period” ends.  
 
2.7 M&As Payment Methods and financing choices 
The lack of internal financing is one of the key challenges in cross-border mergers. Chen, Huang 
and Chen (2009) argue that financing constraints present themselves more in cross-border 
mergers than in domestic mergers. The method of payment in a merger determines the value of a 
target. Acquiring firms that perceive their stock price to be currently overpriced in the market 
will offer a share swop as the method of payment. Di Giuli (2012) reports that the acquirers lead 
the method of payment discussion in order to take advantage of their mispriced stock or to avoid 
overpayment. However, a trade-off presents itself though when the management of the acquirer 
needs to decide on cash or equity. Equity financed transactions have a less likelihood of being 
consummated compared to cash bids. However, in cross-border mergers, the use of shares is 
more popular than a cash swop (Huang, Officer, & Powell, 2016).  
The method of payment in cross-border mergers is informed by various factors in the operating 
environment. Factors such as shareholder protection, the level of a targets corporate governance 
standards, the stock market performance and the quality of reporting all play an important role 
(Huang et al., 2016). The target’s management only accepts the acquirer’s overpriced stock 
because they have overestimated the synergies that are expected to accrue due to the merger. 
Utilizing cash as a means of payment could be a signal to the acquirer’s shareholders. If an 
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acquirer will issue shares when the firm’s share price is overvalued, then the inverse is also true. 
If the acquirer has enough cash resources and has to make a choice between paying with cash or 
equity, then the former will be opted for if the current shares are undervalued to avoid dilution. 
Additionally, using cash eliminates any threats of control. A cash purchase also signals to 
shareholders that the acquirer has sufficient cash resources or has enough debt capacity to raise 
the required amount (Bruslerie, 2013). However, García-Feijóo, Madura, and Ngo, (2012) argue 
that the choice to use cash or equity is industry-specific. The level of free cash flow, financial 
leverage, equity mispricing, and the size of the bidder were identified as factors that influence 
this decision within each industry.  
If a firm has opted for a cash purchase, then that transaction can be financed in either one or a 
combination of the three sources of finance. The firm can elect to use its internally generated 
funds such as cash reserves, or debt can be used to finance the transaction. If the company has no 
other options, then it will resort to issuing out its own equity to finance the transaction.  The 
trade-off theory states that investors ought to use the optimal capital structure that leverages off 
the tax benefit of using debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). This encourages the use of debt as one 
will create value through the tax deductions on the interest expense. The pecking order theory 
presented by Myers (1984) states that a company would go through internally generated funds 
first then resort to issuing equity as the last option. The decision to use a certain type of financing 
over another is influenced by various factors at the time of the merger. For example, the 
acquiring firm’s credit rating affects the firm’s debt capacity and the available cash resources. 
Martynova and Renneboog(2009) conceded that the decision to use internal or external financing 
is informed by the means of payment opted for and the sources of financing available. The 
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financing decision also in turn affects the share premium, the company performance and the 
control of the company amongst other variables. 
Various factors influence the method of financing M&A and these include credit rating and debt 
capacity and available cash resources. 
2.7.1 Credit rating and debt capacity and control 
Karampatsas, Petmezas and Travlos (2014) identified the role of credit ratings in the type of 
financing for mergers. They have found that the absence of a credit rating does not affect 
whether a company will use debt or not to finance their investment and two, if a company does 
have a credit rating then it is the credit level that will impact whether debt will be used or not. As 
expected, the higher the credit rating level, the more debt a firm utilizes in its financing. Firms 
with low credit ratings have high finance distress costs and will not use debt financing. 
It is not easy for a firm that has a high level of leverage to raise debt in the market (Uysal, 2011). 
The level of leverage in the acquiring and target companies influences the decision to partake in 
a merger (Hu & Yang, 2016). Hu and Yang (2016) found that an acquirer that is highly levered is 
less likely to acquire a foreign target. Additionally, targets that are highly levered have a low 
chance of being acquired. Firms also take corrective measures post-merger to adjust their capital 
structure by either issuing equity to lower leverage or increase the level of leverage if it’s too 
high (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Hu & Yang, 2016; Leary & Roberts, 2005). 
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2.7.2 Available Cash Resources 
The availability of excess free cash flow in an acquiring firm with no alternative projects or with 
projects that yield a higher return could be the reason why cash resources could be used to 
finance a cash purchase. Additionally, a firm could be a target because of its liquidity position 
(Correia, Flynn, Uliana, & Wormald, 2007).   
Two main factors the literature identify as commonly affected by the method of financing are 
share premium and control. 
Various factors have been identified to have an impact on the premium paid in a merger. The 
nature of shareholders and the manner in which cash bids are financed are just a few examples. A 
target that has a large group of stockholders will be able to negotiate higher premiums as that 
will assist to strengthen the bargaining power (Stulz, 1988). County level corruption as per an 
index has an impact on premiums. The higher the level of corruption in a host country, the lower 
the premiums to be paid for the target. However, domestic firms are  less sensitive to corruption 
as they are familiar with the country (Weitzel & Berns, 2006). 
 Ciobanua (2015) found that the legal origin of the merger determines the turnover and the size 
of the control premium. Each country applies its own legal system and has its own M&A 
regulations which all contribute to the valuation and the share premium. Another perspective is 
regarding the manner in which cash bids are financed. An acquirer can either finance a cash bid 
in one of three ways. These methods are through internally generated funds such as cash 
reserves, debt or equity. All these financing and payment methods have an outcome on the 
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amount of money that is paid as a premium on the merger (Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008).  
The premium on share purchases has been found to be higher on cash bids that are financed 
through debt compared to equity (Vladimirov, 2015). This is because firms that have debt 
capacity tend to overbid while those that do not need to use equity and underbid. 
The manner in which a firm’s cash offer is financed affects the debt equity ratio in the acquiring 
firm and the control. The use of debt is favoured as it retains decision making with the current 
shareholders. Covenants can be imposed with the introduction of debt. However, these would not 
usually address the operating decisions that management needs to make on a daily basis. 
2.8 Hostile Takeover and Defence Tactics 
A takeover is said to be hostile when the target’s management resists the takeover attempts 
(Firer, Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2012). The management of a target responds to the pressure 
of a takeover in various ways by using different defence tactics. Their action could have adverse 
consequences in the long-term though. Managers of firms facing high takeover pressure tend to 
be myopic in their decision making (Stein, 1988).  
Literature does not provide much evidence about the correlation between the length period of the 
negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations. However, we can look at past examples to 
draw some conclusion about this. The biggest hostile takeover as reported by World Finance 
(2014) is that of American Online (AOL) and Time Warner. Negotiations lasted for 165 days 
until an agreement was reached. While this is not sufficient evidence to form a relationship 
between the time period of negotiations and the outcome of a deal, it is worth noting that the 
longer the negotiation period the more likely the outcome will be hostile. 
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A hostile takeover of firms can be conducted through a tender offer or a proxy contest. A tender 
offer occurs when offers are made directly to the shareholders while bypassing management. A 
proxy contest is when shareholders are persuaded to vote in a certain way. A firm’s capital 
structure has been found to have an influence on whether a tender offer or a proxy contest will be 
the most likely method of hostile takeover in a merger, if any. According to Manne (1965), if a 
company has a block of shareholders then the likelihood of a tender offer is higher. In addition to 
this, Sridharan and Reinganum (1995) reports that the type of inefficiency in a firm determines 
the outcome of a takeover. If management is inefficient and is unable to yield a high return on 
assets or the firm’s stock returns, then there is a high chance of a proxy contest. However, if 
management fails to invest in profitable projects then a proxy offer is more likely. 
2.9 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) stipulates that the price of a share is a correct reflection 
of the fundamentals of the company and therefore no investor can beat the market. Market 
efficiency exists in three forms in the market.  The weak form suggests that shares follow a 
random walk and that it is impossible to predict the next price. Price changes are independent of 
one another and that technical analysis and charting would not assist in determining the future 
price. The price of the share reflects all the historical financial data about the company. There 
has been much debate on whether the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) operates in the weak 
form of efficiency or not. Some scholars found that the JSE operates in the weak form and prices 
follow a random walk (Bonga-Bonga, 2012; Chitenderu, Maredza, & Sibanda, 2014; Jefferis & 
Smith, 2005). 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency suggests that a market correctly prices the shares and 
that only inside information can identify shares that have not been priced correctly. The strong 
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form suggests that all information is reflected in the share price and that both public and non-
public data is captured in the current share price. It is important to identify the form of efficiency 
in which a share trades in order to determine whether the shares are priced fairly or not. 
 
2.10 M&As Post-Acquisition Returns 
In our quest to determine the extent that shareholder’s gain value post-merger, we borrow a few 
pieces from literature to help us understand what drives that.  
2.10.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance is the rules that a company needs to observe in order to give assurance to 
all its stakeholders regarding their interests. South African companies adhere to the King III 
Code and The Companies Act of 2008 as a measure of good corporate governance. However, the 
King III Code has opted to use the “comply or explain” framework instead of the “comply or 
else” framework that is required in the US on the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) explain the impact that Corporate Governance has on post-merger returns.  
This study has found that if the acquirer’s country of origin has better corporate governance 
standards, then the shareholders of the target should expect to gain value through the synergies as 
a result of more protection through corporate governance. Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008) did 
an extension of this and found similar results. Furthermore, they concluded that if a firm with 
lower corporate governance standards acquires the target, then the value of the target will not 
necessarily decrease.   
2.10.2 Market Timing 
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The timing of the market should always be factored when evaluating a merger’s success. During 
a boom, then returns will be positive while during a bust return could be negative. Defensive 
stocks are more resistant to adverse market fluctuations. 
2.10.3 Winner’s Curse 
The estimation of costs while performing valuation calculation in M&A could pose as a threat to 
the valuation of as assets (Bloomfield & Luft, 2006). The winner of a bid has overpaid for that 
bid because they have paid more than the actual value of the asset. When this occurs, then 
premiums paid are higher due the overestimation of the values in a bid (Varaiya, 1988).  This 
could have an adverse impact on the performance of the merged firm as there will be huge 
variances between the forecasted and the actual expenditures. For mergers that had cost saving as 
their main driver then these synergies will not be unlocked entirely. To avoid the “Winners 
Curse”, bidders ought to bid higher than the estimated costs (Bloomfield & Luft, 2006). 
2.10.4 Poor Due Diligence and breakdown during negotiations 
The first stage of a merger is the due diligence. The act of due diligence has been described by 
various writers differently. Tsao (2009) explained that due diligence is a three step process, 
namely: 
 searching for the potential candidates;  
 evaluating the candidates, and  
 assisting the after-transaction integration.  
The process of searching for potential candidates involves considering many aspects like the 
industry, the financial and management strength and market share. An acquiring firm will target 
a firm that has a combination of complementary resources. King, et al (2008) potential acquirers 
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ought to identify companies that have complementary resources as these types of mergers are 
associated with abnormal returns.  
Once a target has been selected the next process would be to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
chosen company. This comprises of a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the target. Many 
firms base their decision to acquire on financial related synergies. However, Lodorfos and 
Boateng (2006) observed that when due diligence focuses exclusively on the financial makeup of 
potential M&A partners, analysts overestimate revenue gains and cost savings and underestimate 
the resource requirements and headaches involved in integrating businesses. To corroborate that 
finding, Ansiinger and Copeland (1996) found that acquirers that were successful are 40% more 
likely to conduct human and cultural due diligence. If this research is conducted extensively, 
then any differences can be dealt with during the negotiation phase. The negotiation phase sets 
the tone for how the merger will unfold. 
Cross-border mergers bring about a new set of variables that will need to be considered during 
the due diligence and subsequently the negotiation phase. It has been found that one of the 
attributes to a successful merger is early cooperative negotiations (Saorı´n-Iborra, 2008). In the 
case of cross-border mergers, the culture of the acquirer and the target might be vastly different. 
However, the culture does influence the communication, the time and power (Ghauri & Usunier, 
2003) during the negotiation phase. The precedence that is set during this phase sets the tone for 
the entire merger period. The cost of due diligence, negotiations and the integration attracts 
higher transaction costs in emerging market acquisitions compared to developed markets (Sun, 
Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). 
2.10.5 Other challenges faced post-merger due to companies being in 
different domiciles 
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The challenges that the merging entities face due to being in different countries contribute to the 
post-merger performance of the firm. Some of these challenges could not be pre-empted during 
the negotiations phase or were merely overlooked or considered trivial. Examples of these are, 
inability to integrate systems timeously smoothly; change in targets operating environment and 
regulator’s approval requirements too burdensome and not sustainable. 
Cultural differences have been found to play a role in cross-border transactions. Whether it 
comes to FDI (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009), the investment into equity (Hwang, 2009) or 
the interest rates from one country to another (Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012), the impact of cultural 
differences plays a vital role. The volume of mergers between two countries that have a small 
cultural difference is high. Additionally, the combined returns are also higher if the companies 
have a smaller cultural difference (Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2015). 
2.11 Post-Merger Recommendations, compliance thereof and impact to social 
welfare 
The approval of a merger by regulators is usually accompanied by a list of prescriptions for the 
merged entity. Examples of such in South Africa would be setting up a fund in order to create 
employment within the community in which the firm operates and retaining retrenchment levels 
below a certain threshold and/or maintaining certain conditions such as BEE scores. In arriving 
at the decision to approve a merger, regulators need to consider not only the current conditions 
but also the standard that will be set into the future for similar mergers in that industry (Nocke & 
Whinston, 2010). The compliance of these recommendations in South Africa and the impact on 
the society is a topic that has not been researched well by scholars to date. The Competition 
Commission of South Africa only conducts tracking of compliance.  
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Chapter Summary 
Mergers are classified into various categories based on the function, location or motive of the 
companies involved. Literature on cross-border mergers involving South African companies is 
limited. Cross-border mergers are mainly driven by the need to increase market share and to take 
advantage of cost efficiencies. These mergers’ success is determined by various factors within 
the merger such as corporate governance, market timing and over bidding which is informed by 
the due diligence performed.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodology used in the study.  Section 3.2 lists the 
data and the data sources and Section 3.3 elaborates on the research design and limitations of the 
event study. Section 3.4 provides the formula for calculating returns and Section 3.5 expounds 
on the how the benchmark is calculated. Lastly, Section 3.6 explains how to calculate normal and 
Section 3.7 explains how to calculate abnormal returns respectively. 
3.2 Data and data sources 
The data needed for this research is daily company and index share prices, which is used to 
determine the abnormal returns pre-and post-acquisition. Accounting data, employment statistics 
and specific company information is also used.  
Share price, accounting data and firm employment data are obtained from Bloomberg. Other 
firm specific data is obtained from newspapers, company websites and the internet. Because this 
is a case study of two prominent cross-border mergers, the research period for each spans two 
years before the announcement, one year for SABMiller after and six years after for Massmart. 
3.3 Research design 
The event study methodology is commonly used by researchers to quantify the impact of certain 
announcements/events on the price of an asset. Glenn and Henderson (1990) explain that event 
studies can be used to either determine a market’s efficiency as in (Fama, Fisher , Jensen , & 
Roll , 1969) or as an information usefulness study. Ball and Brown (1968) used the information 
usefulness study to assess the extent to which a company’s returns respond to an 
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event/announcement. Despite the popularity of this method researchers (Glenn and Henderson, 
1990; Peterson, 1989) have criticized the strength of its estimation, highlighting certain 
limitations which can however be remedied to ensure accurate results. Firstly, the index selected 
when estimating normal returns will have an impact on the calculated abnormal returns. An 
index will identify abnormal returns more if it is an equal weighted index instead of a value 
weighted index (Peterson, 1989). Secondly, when the market model is used to estimate returns 
on daily data evidence of statistically significant autocorrelation has been found. However, 
correcting for this does not enhance the results of the event study as evidenced by Theobald 
(1983). Thirdly, another known issue pertains to the estimation period. The market model 
estimates normal returns based on an estimation period before the event. However, Glenn and 
Henderson (1990) found that the alpha and beta could change significantly post the event and a 
new estimation period is to be used to estimate normal returns after the announcement if the 
event significantly changes these parameters. Lastly, event clustering is also common in event 
studies where too many events/announcements occur at the same time. Daily data is less prone to 
this as the abnormal returns are calculated at the close of each day as the announcements are 
made. Other recent studies (Lebedev et al., 2015; Yoo, Lee & Heo 2013; Matee & Andonov, 
2016) nevertheless still continue to use this methodology and embrace this method to be reliable 
enough for estimations. The logic behind the continuity of this method is the fact that there is a 
lack of consensus in the literature regarding the best models to be adopted when investigating 
investment returns. However, event studies are reliable in the short-run (Khotari & Warner, 
2006) when the events are known and daily data is used to accurately capture abnormal returns. 
In our case, we opted to use this method because it was the best fit to our objectives. 
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The event is the announcement of the M&A and the event date is the day on which it was 
announced. The period before the event date is defined in order to compute normal returns (NR). 
This period is called the estimation period. During this period, the observed returns are normally 
due as we have not found any leakage of information into the media regarding the 
announcements. Additionally, no M&A announcements were made regarding any other merger 
activity relating to the affected parties. 
The event window is the period around which the announcement is made. It is important that this 
period is defined accurately as prior studies done by (Mandelker, 1974) shows that no significant 
evidence of shareholder return was found when the incorrect period was used.  
3.4 Calculating Returns 
The returns of a company can be calculated by the formula: 
Rt = 
𝑃1−𝑃0
𝑃0
          (1) 
Where Rt is the return of the stock, P1 is the share price in time t, P0 is the share price in time t-1. 
 
3.5 Calculating the benchmark 
The market model is used to estimate abnormal returns. The model is chosen as it has been the 
standard model used by scholars to estimate returns and due to the ease of the computation of 
returns using this model. 
The normal return using the single index market model is defined as: 
Rtj= α + βRmt  + εt         (2) 
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Where Rtj is the asset j return at time t, Rmt is the return on a market proxy (JSE Market Index) 
and εt is an error term. α and β are parameters to be estimated. 
3.6 Calculating abnormal returns (AR) 
The AR is defined as the difference between estimated returns and normal returns estimated 
using market model. These abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
ARt= Rt– (α + βRmt + εt)        (3) 
Where AR is the abnormal return at time t, Rti is the asset i return at time t, Rmt is the return on a 
market proxy (JSE market index) and εt is an error term, α and β are parameters to be estimated. 
A normal return is the return estimated if the event did not occur. 
3.7 Calculating Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) is the sum of the AR over the event window. The CAR 
are estimated as below: 
CAR t (t1, t2) = ∑ (t1-t2) AR it        (4)  
Where CARt are the Cumulative AR that are observed over an event window, ARit is the 
Abnormal Returns of asset I at time t.  
The null hypothesis is to be defined as H0: CAR = 0 for each of our case studies under review 
when estimating CAR under various event windows. The t-statistics are calculated as follows: 
𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1,𝑡2)
[𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2))]1/2
         (5) 
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The null hypothesis is to be defined as H0: AR = 0 for each of our case studies under review 
when estimating AR when various announcements are made during the merger. The t-statistics 
are calculated as follows: 
𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1,𝑡2)
[𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2))]1/2
         (6) 
 
Chapter Summary 
The market model is used to estimate abnormal returns under each event window. Three event 
windows have been adopted as similar to Yoo, Lee and Heo (2013) and are used to compare the 
CAR under each window. We estimate the regression from a 100-day estimation period before 
the announcement.  
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the results of the impact on the value of the share price. Section 4.2 is 
the descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 shows the merger announcement effect on shareholders 
wealth by event window and by key event date. Section 4.4 shows the impact on employment 
post the announcement. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 Accounting Data 
Table 1: The financial status of SABMiller before and after the merger announcement 
 
 
 The decision to acquire a target involves a comprehensive due diligence exercise by the 
potential acquirer. This involves the evaluation of qualitative and quantitative information 
retrospectively and forecasts about the future. For SABMiller, the research period in the report is 
two years before the announcement and one after. SABMiller’s year-end is in March and all 
annual financial data represented is obtained from Bloomberg in ZAR. The operating margin 
After
2014 2015 2016
Operating Margin (Rmil) 42 913     48 528     47 602     
Operating Margin (%) 25.40% 26.52% 23.19%
Operating Cashflows (Rmil) 46 120     56 775     64 305     
Current Ratio 0.54 0.59 0.56
Gearing Ratio 28.13% 28.68% 24.60%
Payout Ratio 49.65% 54.99% 72.80%
Price per share 525.94 636.00 896.59
Return on Assets 6.14% 6.69% 6.10%
Return on Equity 12.83% 13.33% 11.72%
Before
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remained consistently high in the two years before the announcement but still relatively low 
compared to AB Inbev’s 38.9% in 2015 (AB Inbev, 2015). The ability to convert profit into cash 
has however been exceptional throughout the years as evidenced by the ability to generate 
operating cash flows that are higher than the operating profit.  Short-term liquidity in SABMiller 
remains consistently low. A low current ratio and gearing ratio (long-term debt) indicates that 
SABMiller is able to finance more of its activities with short-term debt than long-term debt. An 
increasing pay-out ratio signals an excess of cash on hand which is financed by the increase in 
cash from operating activities. It is one or a combination of these indicators that resulted in 
SABMiller being a favourable candidate for AB Inbev. 
Table 2: Financial Status of Massmart before the announcement 
 
 
In the year of the announcement Walmart’s operating margin for Walmart was 6.05% compared 
to Massmart’s 4.28%. Due to larger scales, Walmart is able to obtain better efficiencies and 
therefore higher operating margins. Upon comparison of these margins to its competitor Pick and 
Pay that achieved an average of 1.2%, OI margin for the five-year period from 2012-2016 
Massmart still outperformed Pick and Pay. 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Operating Margin (Rmil) 2 474.50  1 964.80  2 028.70  1 681.50  2 017.80  2 005.60  2 015.60  2 259.90  
Operating Margin (%) 6.22% 4.56% 4.28% 3.18% 3.30% 2.78% 2.58% 2.67%
Operating Cashflows (Rmil) 1 639.40  888.60     1 253.60  1 137.80  312.80     1 914.50  745.60     1 770.40  
Current Ratio 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.85
Gearing Ratio 22.73% 4.36% 8.98% 10.13% 12.91% 15.33% 23.51% 27.72%
Payout Ratio 59.10 63.74 68.82 98.39 73.29 71.23 84.65 81.93
Price per share 61.70 80.00 118.00 132.39 168.35 135.48 143.93 103.20
Return on Assets 11.55% 10.23% 8.77% 5.56% 6.47% 5.66% 3.92% 3.73%
Return on Equity 52.83% 41.82% 34.64% 22.56% 28.20% 26.93% 20.55% 20.29%
Before After
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The ability to convert profit into cash each year is poor with almost half of the profit not 
converted into cash for each year before the merger. The working capital policy adopted by 
Massmart is moderate to conservative. The current ratio is low and so is financial gearing. The 
merger resulted in Massmart taking more debt than before. Despite a decline in operating cash 
flows, the pay-out ratio increased in 2009 and has not declined to a ratio of below 71% since the 
merger announcement. An increase in the asset base diminishes the ROA as the asset turnover is 
not high. 
4.2.2 Other Measures 
Type of shareholders 
As per Table 3, SABMiller was owned by a total of 59,261 shareholders at the end of 2016 with 
the biggest percentage (39.40%) being owned by 22 other corporate entities. Banks held the least 
stake in the company with only a total of 9% investment held by them. In June 2009, the major 
shareholder in Massmart was Aberdeen Asset Management Group (12.4%), an asset 
management firm based in the US and the second largest shareholder was the Public Investment 
Corporation (9.4%). The ownership was spread across South Africa (42%), US (25%) and the 
UK and other (32%). In comparison to other retailers listed on the JSE, Massmart has 
consistently attracted a higher percentage of foreign investors (Massmart, 2009).   
Share performance before acquisition 
SABMiller’s Jan du Plessis reported in the last Annual Financial Statements issued that the total 
shareholders return since listing in 1999 is about 1500%. The company has performed 
exceptionally well throughout the years with a 10 years Compounded Growth Rate (CAGR) of 
20% since 2006. Operating margins have also improved over the past 10 years with an average 
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of 22%. This outstanding financial performance increases the value of the company and also 
makes it a more attractive target. The share price of Massmart has been growing at an average of 
0.20% for the financial year 2010 and only at 0.06% and 0.04% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. 
The 10 year CAGR is 32.62% until the announcement date. 
Target and acquirers capital structure 
SABMiller has maintained a constant level of leverage with the total debt averaging at 48.2% for 
the past 10 years ending 2015 with the highest being 53.5% and the lowest at 41.8%. The debt 
composition has changed over the years with a larger portion comprising long-term debt and a 
smaller portion of short-term debt. The average gearing levels in AB Inbev have been similar 
with the 10-year ending 2015 average being at 49.47%. Massmart had a low debt ratio of 2.7% in 
2010 with 91% of its debt comprising of short-term debt. The debt ratio in Walmart in the same 
year was 24.25%, which shows a higher level of gearing. 
Cash balances and FCF for target and acquirers firms 
SABMiller’s cash from operations in the 2016 financial statements showed a healthy 
$3,415million in comparison to a profit figure of $2,922 million. This resulted in a positive cash 
balance of 1,271 after accounting for investing and financing activities. AB Inbev had a cash 
balance of $6,923 million, cashflows from operations of $18,063 million and a profit figure of 
$9,867million. The free cashflow of SABMiller and AB Inbev was R25.78 per basic share and 
R71.59 respectively in 2015, indicating that AB Inbev had a more robust cash management 
process than SABMiller. Massmart has a strong cashflow with a balance of R1.3 billion in the 
year ending 30 June 2010. The average five-year growth rate in 2010 in cash and equivalents is 
14%. As per Bloomberg the company's Free Cash Flow in years ending 2009 and 2010 is R194 
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million and R623.5 million respectively. The free cashflow per basic share in June 2010 was 
R3.11 compared to R25.17 in Walmart. 
Market share strength 
SABMiller was first or second in place in 94% of their markets in the year 2016 (SABMiller, 
2016 Financial Report). AB Inbev has also had a high market share in all its territories with it 
occupying the first position in Brazil, Argentina, Belgium, and South Korea, among other 
territories (ABInbev, 2016). The only continent in which AB Inbev did not have a presence is in 
Africa, SABMiller’s second largest market in revenue contribution led by Latin America. 
Massmart enjoyed increasing market shares in specific items such as Multimedia, Technology 
and Appliances in the year ending 2010. The introduction of Foodco, a fresh food section in 
Game Stores in 2011, ushered the group to new competitors and further increased market share. 
This raised a series of lawsuits between Massmart and its competitors Spar, Pick and Pay, and 
Shoprite, as Massmart’s Game Stores started to sell fresh foods in the same malls where these 
competitors were based. These giant retailers have entered into lease contracts with the various 
landlords which restrict other retailers from selling any fresh food and therefore preventing any 
competition. This then prompted the Competition Commission to initiate an inquiry in the retail 
market. This inquiry commenced on 27 November 2015 and is expected to be completed in May 
2017. 
Credit rating 
SABMiller’s credit rating from Moody’s Investors Service was lifted from Baa1 with a positive 
outlook to A3 with a stable outlook in June 2015. However, this was under review to downgrade 
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in May 2016 to align to AB Inbev’s credit rating. The credit rating from S&P Global Ratings 
remains at A- with a stable outlook (SABMiller, 2016). 
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Table 3: Other Measures in year of announcement 
 
 
SABMiller Massmart 
Industry Fast Moving Consumer Goods Retail 
Type of shareholders Banks : 0.09% 
Individual nominees and trusts : 5.51% 
Insurance Companies : 3.64% 
Investment Companies : 0.54% 
Medical Aid Schemes : 0.14 
Mutual Funds : 21.45% 
Other Corporate Entities : 39.40% 
Pension Funds : 11.78% 
Other : 17.45%  
Aberdeen Asset Management Group : 16.6% 
Public Investment Corporation : 13.8% 
JP Morgan Asset Management : 7.5% 
Lazard Asset Management LLC Group : 6.9% 
Baillie Gifford & Co Ltd : 5.4% 
Other (less than 5% each) : 49.8 % 
Share performance before 
acquisition 
10 year CAGR : 20.25% 10 year CAGR : 32.62 % 
Target and acquirers capital 
structure 
10 year total debt average : 48.2%  Debt ratio of 2.7% in 2010 
    
Cash balances and FCF for 
target and acquirers firms 
Cash from operations : $3,415m  
 
Profit: $2,922m 
 
Cash Balance after investing and 
financing activities : +$1,271m 
Cash from operations: R1,254m 
 
Profit: R1,129m 
 
Cash Balance after financing and investing activities: R1,311.m 
Market share strength SABMiller was first or second in place 
in 94% of their markets in the year. 
Massmart enjoyed increasing market shares in specific items such as 
Multimedia, Technology and Appliances in the year ending 2010.  
Credit rating Moody’s Investors Service : A3 with a 
stable outlook in June 2015  
 
S&P Global Ratings : A- with a stable 
outlook  
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4.3 Effect of acquisition on the Shareholders Wealth 
In order to assess the impact that the merger has had on the total wealth of shareholders, we have 
calculated AR and CAR abnormal returns of SABMiller and Massmart during the timeline of the 
merger announcements. The negotiations extended for a period of about nine months in the 
SABMiller merger and over eight months in the Massmart merger. We have then identified 
events that were announced and created a timeline showing the corresponding AR and CAR over 
a specific period. 
Table 4: SABMiller and Massmart CAR per event Window  
 
SABMiller CAR Massmart CAR 
[-10;+15] 15.02%* [-10;+15] 1.51% 
  (1.7) 
 
(0.38) 
[-5;+5] 16.81%** [-5;+5] 8.70%** 
  (2.28) 
 
(2.03) 
[-1;+1] 18.22%** [-1;+1] 10.45%** 
  (2.31) 
 
(2.1) 
[0] 15.85%** [0] 9.83%** 
  (2.16)   (2.14) 
 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 ** Significant at the 5% level 
   * Significant at the 10% level 
 
4.3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns by event window 
 
The CAR are the sum of the AR under each event window. The higher the CAR, the higher the 
accumulation of AR of the stock price since the start of the event window. Table 4 shows the 
results of the event study after using different event windows to estimate normal returns using an 
OLS Regression. After determining the AR of each event window, the CAR was calculated by 
53 | P a g e  
 
adding all observed AR. The larger the CAR, the larger the shock to the accumulated price of the 
stock. To determine the significance of the results statistically significant positive CAR (+) 
indicate an increase in shareholder wealth and negative CAR (-) shows a decline in shareholder 
value. The results show all values are significant for the SABMiller merger and all CARs are 
positive. The most significant observation is at [-1;+1] showing a CAR of 18.22% . The CAR at 
[-10; +15] are smaller than that of [-1;+1] and less significant which indicates that the increase in 
shareholder wealth is short-lived due to declining CAR. There exists a pattern about the level of 
significance for each event window; the longer the event window the less significant the CAR.  
The results under Massmart are not all significant and the positive relationship between M&A 
and shareholder wealth is not prevalent in all event windows used. As similar to the results 
shown by SABMiller, Massmart’s CAR are short-lived as they decrease with the passing of time. 
Short event windows have high CAR and longer windows have lower CAR. This is an indication 
that information had not reached the market before the announcement with an overreaction on 
the share price showing CAR of 9.83% on the day of the announcement and only 1.51% 15 days 
after the announcement.   
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4.3.2 Abnormal returns by event announcement 
 
As per Table 5, the highest observed AR is on the day of the announcement of the merger (t0) 
with abnormal returns reaching a high of 15.73%.  The second highest impact on a single day on 
the stock price is when both companies reached an agreement in principle about the M&A and 
the offered share price was now valued at 44 GBP, a 24% increase from the initial offered 
amount of 35.59 GBP.  
On that day, SABMiller’s closing price on the London Stock Exchange was 39.48 GBP.  On the 
day that AB Inbev listed on the JSE, SABMiller’s AR showed an increase in investor confidence 
in the company by a slight increase in the share price. The negative AR’s observed in t4 and t17   
are an indication that investors’ perception was that SABMiller’s management was overstating 
the current value of the company. Management rejected both offers of 35.59 GBP and 43.50 
GBP but investors did not share the same sentiment.  The most significant event was the 
announcement to acquire SABMiller (t0) followed by the day when both companies reached an 
agreement in principle for a 44 GBP cash offer. The announcement to increase the offer price to 
43.50 GBP in t17 was not significant neither did it increase the shareholders’ value.  
A similar pattern of reactions by Massmart investors can be seen in the AR results in Table 6. 
The highest AR’s were observed on the day of the announcement and the only significant return 
is on the day of the announcement. This overreaction of 9.8% had not yet captured the union’s 
adverse reaction to the announcement. The main reason for the protest action by the union was 
job preservation as Massmart had already retrenched more than 500 workers in June that same 
year. Local retailers also supported the unions against the merger as they were facing 
55 | P a g e  
 
competition threat. Though not significant, the offer made by Walmart positively affected 
shareholders returns and only when the unions raised their concern do returns decline. 
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Table 5: SABMiller AR per Significant Event Announcement 
 
    
 
  
t Date    AR%   
0 2015-09-16 15.73%*** 
AB Inbev communicated the intention of acquiring SABMiller.      (14.4836) 
4 2015-09-22 -0.97% 
The full board rejects an offer of GBP 35.59 a share.     (-0.8944) 
17 2015-10-12 -1.61% 
AB InBev has announced to the market today that it has put an improved proposal to SABMiller of GBP 43.50 
in cash, with a partial cash and share alternative.     (-1.4781) 
18 2015-10-13 9.46%*** SABMiller and AB InBev makes a joint statement to the London and Johannesburg stock exchanges, saying 
that they reached agreement in principle on the key terms of a possible recommended offer to be made by AB 
InBev for SABMiller. The SABMiller Board said that it would be prepared unanimously to recommend the all-
cash offer of GBP 44 per SABMiller share.     (8.707) 
29 2015-10-28 -0.61% The deadline for AB InBev to make a formal offer has been extended by a week. AB InBev stated that it had 
completed its confirmatory due diligence review of SABMiller and reconfirmed the financial and other terms 
that our Board is prepared to recommend. AB InBev has also confirmed that they have financing ready to fund 
the possible offer.      (-0.5598) 
34 2015-11-04 -0.91% SABMiller and AB InBev release a joint statement stating that the Board has extended the deadline by a further 
week for AB InBev to make a formal offer to acquire SABMiller.     (-0.8396) 
35 2015-11-05 -0.27% SABMiller and AB Inbev have reached agreement on the terms of an AB InBev offer to acquire SABMiller. 
The SABMiller Board has expressed their intention to recommend to shareholders to vote in favour of the 
transaction being at an offer price is £44 per share. Regulatory approval is still required in various countries. 
SABMiller and AB InBev have agreed a final deadline for completion in May 2017.     (-0.2516) 
83 2016-01-15 2.28%** 
AB Inbev lists on the JSE     (2.099) 
t=0: The day of the merger announcement. T-statistics are in parenthesis 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 ** Significant at the 5% level 
   * Significant at the 10% level   
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Table 6: Massmart AR per Significant Event Announcement 
 
    
 
  
t Date AR   
0 2010-09-27 9.8%*** 
Walmart announces the intention to acquire Massmart for ZAR148 per share.     (6.3379) 
1 2010-09-28 -0.2% 
Management engages with shareholders regarding the announcement made which could result in the 
acquisition of Massmart for R148 per share.     (-0.1188) 
45 2010-11-29 1.1% 
Wal-Mart made a $2.3 billion formal bid for control of Massmart. This offer is a 19.2% premium and has been 
recommended by Massmart directors.     (0.7034) 
78 2011-01-17 0.6% 
Massmart's shareholders have voted in favour of the acquisition.     (0.4182) 
79 2011-01-18 -1.0% 
An employees union, SACCAWU engages in a protest in opposition of the decision made the day before.     (-0.6152) 
83 2011-01-24 1.0% Due to representation requests from SACCAWU, the South African Competition Commission has applied to 
the Competition Tribunal for an extension.     (0.6119) 
100 2011-02-14 0.1% The Competition Commission concludes its investigation and recommends that the Competition Tribunal 
approves the acquisition without conditions     (0.0518) 
128 2011-03-14 -1.0% 
Mark Lamberti has been asked to stay as the independent non-executive Chairman of the board of Massmart.     (-0.6498) 
206 2011-05-31 1.2% The acquisition of Massmart by Walmart has been approved with conditions by the authorities in South Africa. 
Unions have expressed their anger.     (0.7956) 
t=0: The day of the merger announcement. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 ** Significant at the 5% level 
   *Significant at the 10% level
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4.3.3 Value based on operating performance 
Table 7: SABMiller Performance Benchmark 
 
 
 
The comparative analysis for SABMiller spans for two years before the announcement and one 
year after. The FTSE All Share Index is used as a benchmark on ROE, Operating Margin and the 
PE Ratio. During the year of the announcement and after SABMiller’s ROE has performed better 
than the market. Upon comparing the operating margin to the market’s margin SABMiller is able 
to extract healthier margins due to operational efficiencies. The average PE ratio for JSE 
companies’ ranges between 17-52 over the research period and SABMiller has underperformed 
after the announcement. 
 
 
 
 
ROE -2 -1 0 1
SABMiller 12.63% 12.83% 13.33% 11.72%
  FTSE All-Share Index 12.28% 13.24% 5.56% 4.34%
Excess over market 0.36% -0.41% 7.77% 7.38%
Operating Margin -2 -1 0 1
SABMiller 24.11% 25.40% 26.52% 23.19%
  FTSE All-Share Index 9.82% 6.85% 5.80% 5.24%
Excess over market 14.29% 18.55% 20.71% 17.94%
PE Ratio -2 -1 0 1
SABMiller 16.52      24.42     25.70      27.32     
  FTSE All-Share Index 17.45      22.57     36.45      51.74     
Excess over market -0.93      1.84       -10.75    -24.42    
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Table 8: Massmart Performance Benchmark 
 
 
 
The comparative analysis for Massmart spans for two years before and five years after the 
announcement. Upon comparing the All Share Index performance to Massmart’s results, we are 
able to capture any variances in financial performance.  Massmart’s ROE has declined below 
30% in the year of the announcement and has remained low compared to the two years before. 
The group has four store chains each operating under a different banner.  Massdiscounters 
consist of Game Stores and Makro. Masscash remains the highest revenue contributor, has the 
lowest operating margin and is composed of Rhino Cash and Carry, Cambridge and other retail 
brands which target a lower LSM. Massmart’s operating margin declined in 2013 and remained 
at this lower level to date. This can be explained by a mix variance with a 2% shift in the 
operating margin contribution into Masswarehouse which declined profitability in 2013-2014.  
Compared to the benchmark index, Massmart’s operating margin is way below the acceptable 
norm in all the years under review.   
ROE -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Massmart 52.83% 41.82% 34.64% 22.56% 28.20% 26.93% 20.55% 20.29%
FTSE All-Share Index 16.75% 11.86% 16.72% 18.51% 12.34% 11.67% 12.11% 2.92%
Excess over market 36.08% 29.96% 17.91% 4.05% 15.86% 15.25% 8.45% 17.37%
Operating Margin -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Massmart 6.22% 4.56% 4.28% 3.18% 3.30% 2.78% 2.58% 2.67%
FTSE All-Share Index 18.80% 12.37% 16.94% 19.31% 12.76% 13.62% 14.60% 6.29%
Excess over market -12.58% -7.81% -12.67% -16.13% -9.46% -10.85% -12.02% -3.63%
PE Ratio -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Massmart 14.02      11.58     15.55      24.30     37.21      30.86     21.39     27.13     
FTSE All-Share Index 9.90       19.43     14.32      11.93     18.02      17.49     15.31     30.19     
Excess over market 4.13       -7.85      1.23       12.37     19.19      13.37     6.08       -3.06      
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The PE ratio, which is a multiplier on earnings, is higher after the announcement compared to 
before in relation to the industry. Investors’ future perceptions about Massmart remained positive 
for three years post the announcement with a negative variance in the most recent periods.  
1.1 Impact on unemployment 
In order to determine the impact that the merger announcement had on the employment we 
analysed the headcount by year of SABMiller and Massmart pre-and post the merger 
announcement.  
Table 9: SABMiller Headcount by Year 
 
 
Before 
 
After 
Year 2014 2015 Average 2016 Average 
Headcount 69,947 68,808 69,378 70,089 70,089 
% growth   -1.63%   1.03%   
 
With only one year post the announcement, the financial information of SABMiller does not give 
a medium term view of the headcount statistics in the company. Post the announcement it 
appears as if the headcount has increased yet is expected to decline significantly in the future. 
Included in these statistics are employees that form part of the soft drink division that is to be 
sold off to The Coca-Cola Company during 2017. A further reduction is expected as voluntary 
retrenchment letters have been issued to about 1000 management level staff in December 2016 
by AB Inbev.  However, management has assured the Commission that these retrenchments will 
not have an impact on the merger commitment.  
 
 
 
  
61 | P a g e  
 
Table 10: Massmart Headcount by Year 
 
 
Pre-Merger 
Year 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Headcount 24,105 24,279 26,324 24,903 
No. of Stores 242 256 288 262 
Ave. 
Staff/Store 100 95 91 95 
% growth 
 
-4.79% -3.62% 
  
 
Post-Merger 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Headcount 27,432 32,126 37,554 47,209 48,035 38,471 
No. of Stores 313 357 374 392 403 368 
Ave. 
Staff/Store 88 90 100 120 119 105 
% growth -4.11% 2.68% 11.58% 19.94% -1.03% 
  
The average staff per store pre-merger announcement is 95 employees. After the merger 
announcement, the number increased to an average of 105 per store. Massmart employed a high 
number of employees in 2013 following the opening of a net of 39 new stores. This increased the 
average per store from 90 to 100 employees. The number of employees is positively correlated to 
the number of stores that are opened each year.  The level of employment has been maintained to 
date proving that Walmart has not reduced the number of employees since the takeover. The 
increase in employees in 2013 corresponds with the decline in profitability experienced in the 
same year. A trade-off exists between profitability and the number of employees. The 
Competition Commission had restricted Massmart from retrenchments for two years post-merger 
yet even after this period has passed the headcount does not decline. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
The results presented in this chapter indicate that a merger announcement and subsequent merger 
activities do have an effect on shareholders’ returns in target companies. The effects are 
measured first by event windows to estimate at which level is the highest CAR. The highest 
CAR under both studies are on the day of the announcement and the longer the event window the 
lower the CAR. No information leakage has occurred as investors react the most on the day of 
the announcement with the highest level of significance. Event announcements also show the 
impact of significance each milestone during a merger will have on the Abnormal Returns for 
that day.  
We have also found a relationship between the number of employees and profitability. 
Massmart’s sharp decline in the operating margin can be attributed to an increase in operating 
costs driven by the headcount. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Section 5.2 in the chapter discusses the results, and Section 5.3 discusses the conclusion of the 
thesis. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
The objective of the research is to determine if shareholders in Massmart and SABMiller derived 
any incremental value in their investments after the merger announcements. Additionally, 
accounting data and employment statistics were used to determine the impact that the 
announcement made on these performance indicators. 
Motives 
The acquisition of SABMiller and Massmart are both large cross-border horizontal mergers. As 
consistent with the literature, the main motives for acquiring SABMiller by AB Inbev and 
Massmart by Walmart were to increase market share (Kim et al., 1993) and to leverage on 
operating efficiencies for AB Inbev in order to reduce costs. South Africa is not considered as a 
tax haven for investors. Therefore, there are no tax advantages that are expected to accrue from 
the acquisitions. As both SABMiller and Massmart are listed on the JSE and all financial reports 
are publicly available, it can be said that the acquirers had an accurate estimations of the assets in 
the targets. Both companies under review have previous merger experience with a few failed 
transactions by Walmart while AB Inbev is a successful three-way merger between Ambev, 
InterBrew and Anhueser Busch. As consistent with the findings by Haleblian et al., (2006), 
management’s past success has been a motivation to undertake in other merger transactions. 
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Bonds financed the acquisition of SABMiller. With a credit rating of A-, AB Inbev managed to 
raise debt which was rated by Moodys at A3 (Moodys, 2016). As consistent with Karamptsas et 
al., (2014) the company’s credit rating was at a low risk and therefore debt was used to finance 
the acquisitions.  
Value Creation: Shareholder Returns, Accounting Data and Employment 
 
In determining whether the acquisition of South African companies’ results in the creation of 
value, this study has found that that is not always the case. Upon analysing the share price of 
Massmart from the time of announcement to date, we conclude that value was in fact lost since 
the acquisition as consistent with a study by Aybar and Ficici (2009). Any increase in value was 
short-lived and offset by negative news emanating from disgruntled union members. In contrast, 
SABMiller’s shareholders continued to enjoy growth in their investments after the merger 
announcement with slight adverse share price movements (t29, t34 and t35) in which markets 
correct for at later periods (t83).   
Upon analysing Massmart’s accounting data, we noted a decline in the Return on Equity relative 
to the benchmark with an 8-year low of 20.29% in 2015. Operation margins have remained 
lower than the benchmark but have also declined since the merger announcement. The declining 
trend in turn affects the PE ratio which is a multiple to value a company based on the future 
expectations. SABMiller has outperformed the benchmark on both Return on Equity and 
Operating Margin after the merger announcement. The PE has increased after the merger 
announcement but not at the same rate as the benchmark.  
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Since the merger, the headcount in Massmart has increased by an average of 10 people per store. 
The study by Nowiński (2006) asserts that in cross-border mergers, retrenchments contribute to 
merger success more than integration depth or changing the management. This can explain the 
declining profitability since the announcement and the loss of shareholder value. 
 
Corporate Governance, the timing of the transaction in relation to other market activates and 
overbidding have been identified as factors that could affect post-acquisition returns. Upon 
analysing these factors within the context of the case studies under review, it has been found that 
the corporate governance standards of both target companies are high as they are listed on the 
JSE. Walmart’s corporate governance standards are higher than Massmart as it is listed on an 
exchange that is ranked higher. As per Bris et al. (2008), it does not appear as if any synergies 
accrued to Massmart through this increased shareholder protection. Both mergers occurred after 
the most recent global financial crisis to date with the Walmart merger occurring at a time when 
the markets were still recovering and the AB Inbev at a later date.  Our model factors the market 
timing as abnormal returns are computed relative to the market’s performance. Both CEO’s have 
experience in international mergers. The due diligence performed informs the offer price per 
share to the shareholders and should be comprehensive to avoid overbidding. Walmart’s 
management has overpaid for their 51% stake in Massmart with the share price being 30% lower 
than the offer price six years after the announcement as consistent with Varaiya (1998). 
SABMiller’s closing share price was 44.95 GBP upon delisting in October 2016, which is equal 
to the offer price of 45 GBP. A more accurate valuation done by AB Inbev indicates that no 
value has been lost due to the acquisition. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
 The main reasons behind the acquisition of Massmart and SABMiller were to increase 
the market share as both acquiring companies did not have a presence in Africa. AB 
Inbev also expects to extract cost synergies due to streamlining operations. 
 SABMiller’s shareholders have benefitted from the merger announcement due to an 
increase in the share price post announcement. As the company has been delisted, we 
could not measure the effect on returns post integration. Massmart’s shareholders have 
lost their investment’s value through price depreciation since the acquisition. 
 The JSE is efficient in the semi strong form as the merger announcements were most 
significant on the merger day. The overreaction was short-lived in the Massmart case as 
other adverse news affected the share price negatively. SABMiller’s shareholders 
enjoyed a higher shareholder return for longer.  
 The medium-to long-term post- merger impact on SABMilller could not be measured due 
to the timing. Massmart’s operating margins have declined and employment increased. 
 
Despite the extensive literature of mergers and acquisitions globally, there exists very little case 
study research conducted on mergers into Africa and fewer on South African mergers.  With this 
study, we sought to contribute to the literature in two ways; firstly, we report on the results of 
two case studies in South Africa and the impact that merger announcements have had on their 
returns. Secondly, we find that these reactions could be short-lived if adverse announcements 
follow the merger announcement such as protest actions by employee unions. There are 
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limitations to the study as we have only isolated two case studies of mergers that have occurred 
in South Africa. The estimation of abnormal returns is subject to human error. Future research 
should aim to investigate the post-merger performance of a larger sample of firms. SABMiller’s 
long-term post-merger announcement financial results have not been captured as the company 
has been delisted and operates as AB Inbev at the time of concluding the research. The 
measurement of AB Inbev profits in Africa could not be measured due to the timing as these 
results are not yet available. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 11: Merger Background 
 
 
SABMiller Massmart 
Merger    
Background 
On the 16th September 2015 AB Inbev 
communicated the intention of acquiring 
SABMiller. AB Inbev cited two fundamental 
reasons for the acquisition namely i) cost 
savings and ii) growth opportunities. The 
shareholders of SABMiller accepted the offer 
about 56 days after the offer price was 
revised about four times. Notably, one of the 
main shareholders called Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC) that owned 3.42% was 
highly concerned about the impact of the 
deal on the economy if it goes though. Job 
losses and the adverse impact thereof on the 
country was the main concern. Additionally, 
it was not clear initially if AB Inbev would 
still keep SABMiller listed on the JSE or not 
after the transaction. Nevertheless, after 
some shareholder activism the deal was 
successful with AB Inbev management 
committing to minimizing any possible job 
losses and to keep the new entity listed as 
AB Inbev on the JSE after delisting 
SABMiller. 
 
 
 
 
 
The intention to acquire 100% of Massmart was communicated on 27 
September 2010 by the management of Walmart, an American family 
owned retail business. The reason for the acquisition was the need to 
increase the company’s presence and expand into unexplored markets. 
The initial offer price was not revised and 106 days later the offer was 
accepted by the shareholders of Massmart. The first price proposed was 
accepted by stakeholders with no public shareholder activism. 
Employees were concerned about job stability while management and 
shareholders saw this as an opportunity to have access to more scales of 
economies. Walmart had an intention of acquiring 100% of Massmart 
but scaled down to only 51% which is just enough to have control.  
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Length of 
negotiations and 
critical stages in 
the negotiation 
process 
The merger between SAB and AB Inbev 
took longer to conclude due to the various 
stakeholders that were involved. Initially, the 
management team at SABMiller showed 
some resistance towards AB Inbev. The 
entire merger was approved by the 
competition commission in South Africa on 
31 May 2016, less than a year after the 
announcement to acquire was made. This is a 
shorter period than the time it for the 
Competition Commission to decide on a 
local merger between Coca-Cola Bottling 
partners in South Africa to form Coca-Cola 
Beverages South Africa. This merger 
announcement was made on November 2014 
and was only approved in May 2016, 18 
months later. The experience of AB Inbev’s 
leadership team in international mergers can 
be attributed to this speedy resolution.  
The intent to acquire Massmart at a price of R148 per share was 
announced on 27 September 2010. On 14 February the Competition 
Commission referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal. This is 
after an extension application by the Competition Commission that was 
raised due to labour concerns initiated by SACCAWU.  The intention to 
retain Mark Lamberti, the current CEO of Massmart was communicated 
by Walmart on 14 March prior to the approval by the Competition 
Tribunal. After 106 days of engaging with various stakeholders the 
Competition Tribunal approved the merger with conditions. The entire 
transaction took a total of 246 days from the day it was announced until 
the day approval was obtained by the competition tribunal.  
 
 
Cost Synergies Bloomberg (2016) further states that the cost 
saving from the deal is less than the previous 
savings synergies that AB Inbev obtained. 
The cost savings as a % of sales of the 
merger is just below 10% whilst the group’s 
latest acquisition in 2012 of the remaining 
share in Mexican brewer Grupo Modelo 
yielded almost 16% of savings as a 
percentage of synergies. The new merged 
entity promises to bring efficiencies through 
procurement, distribution, productivity and 
by sharing best practice in the management 
of costs. These synergies are expected to 
compensate for the loss of revenue from the 
sale of these world-renowned brands.  An 
estimated $1.4 billion per annum is expected 
in cost savings by the end of the fourth year   
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after the formation of Mega Brew (ABInbev, 
2016). 
Financing In order to finance the $110bn deal AB Inbev 
issued bonds over the negotiation period. In 
January 2016 AB Inbev issued out corporate 
bonds to the value of $46bn. In March 2016, 
a further $15bn (13.25 euros) in bonds was 
issued to provide the company with even 
more financing for the merger. The option of 
utilizing shares in order to finance the deal 
was only open to the main shareholders of 
the SABMiller being the Santa Domingo 
Family and the Altria Group who owned 
15% and 27% respectively.     
Merger Conditions The current SABMiller - AB Inbev deal in 
South Africa is structured under the 
following conditions set by the Competition 
Commission:  
A fund that will serve the purpose of 
empowering members of the community is 
required to be set up. This fund is to finance 
the agreed upon projects over a 5-year 
period. 
A secondary listing on the JSE is required in 
order to ensure that SABMiller is replaced 
once it has been delisted. 
A commitment of R50m was required in 
order to finance projects that aim to reduce 
the harmful use of alcohol. 
The South African Authorities granted the deal in May 2011 under the 
followingtconditions  
There should be no retrenchments for a period of 2 years after the 
transaction.has.been.completed. 
Before the merger was announced Massmart had retrenched 503 
employees. These employees need to be considered first when 
opportunities are available. 
The status of SACCAWU as the largest representative union should not 
change for three years. 
 
A committee is to be set-up by the merged entity to administer a 
R100mil fund which is expected to serve the purpose of developing local 
suppliers for 3 years.   
A status report of the progress of the fund should be given to the 
Competition Tribunal of South Africa annually.  
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In preparation for the merger, SABMiller’s 
management disposed of some of its 
prominent brands namely Peroni, Grolsch 
and Meantime beers in order to smooth 
regulation approvals in Europe. 
Method of 
payment and 
premium paid 
SABMiller has been acquired through a cash 
offer too and a share option for the two main 
shareholders being Altria Group and BevCo. 
These two main shareholders voted as a 
separate share class and were both given a 
share option too. The initial offer price of 44 
GBP was increased to 45 GBP post the 
adverse currency fluctuations caused by 
Brexit, this increase in the offer price was put 
forward by AB Inbev to protect 
shareholders’ interest.  
Walmart paid in cash for the acquisition of Massmart and not through a 
share exchange. This is due to the high risk of entering into a developing 
market and the uncertainty of whether the endeavour will be profitable 
or not. Utilizing cash as means of payments gives Walmart an easier way 
out of the transaction of there is a need to disinvest. The price per share 
of R148 represents a 19.2% premium on the average share price of 
Massmart. 
Corporate 
governance 
standard 
SABMiller has complied with the UK 
Corporate Governance Code which also 
follows a “comply or explain” doctrine. Five 
counts of nonconformity to the code were 
listed in the 2015 Annual report and the 
reasons thereto. Both companies are listed on 
major exchanges and the requirement of 
good corporate governance standards is 
imperative to their eligibility to remain listed 
and not an option although this comes at a 
cost. 
The King III Report is a standard of good corporate governance in South 
Africa. The King III Report requires a “comply or explain” doctrine as 
opposed to the Sarbarnes Oxley Act which has adopted a “comply or 
else” doctrine. In 2010 Massmart has declared their compliance to King 
III with eight exceptions and explanations, the major being that Mark 
Lamberti the Chairman of the board has not been considered to be 
independent as he used to serve as the CEO in prior years.  However, all 
the other four board committees had independent directors.  
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